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Abstract: 
 
This essay briefly describes George Monbiot's vision of how the 
global economy should operate, and briefly describes Hans Küng's 
understanding of what the global ethic is. It is noted that Monbiot 
and Küng are radicals because they view economic practicalities in 
morally directed terms. Their work forges a direct link between 
discourses of ethical meaning and discourses of practical rationality. 
Such a link is radical because it goes against the grain of the 
Modernist separation of facts from meanings, and this separatism is 
deeply embedded in the contemporary Western Weltanschauung. 
Our Weltanschauung tacitly defines normalcy and legitimacy for the 
prevailing economic and political status quo.  
 
This essay maintains that overcoming the difficulties of linking the 
global economy to the global ethic can only be accomplished by a 
transformation of the Western Weltanschauung. Until our worldview 
requires economic facts and moral meanings to synthesise, we 
cannot radically change our world order in the direction in which 
both Monbiot and Küng advocate. Hence, this essay explores the 
relationship between facts and meanings in Western cultural history 
in order to clarify what sort of a "metaphysical mutation" we need to 
undergo to create an ethical global economy. 
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1.  Two Radical Propositions 
 
Consider these two radical propositions: firstly, that there is no global economy, 
secondly that there is a global ethic. 
 
There is no global economy 
 
George Monbiot argues1 that until there are global institutions capable of impartially 
seeing the globe as one economy, and capable of effectively implementing 
mechanisms that govern and balance that economy fairly, we do not have a genuinely 
global economy. What we do have is an internationalist economy tailored to serve and 
protect the dominant powerful interests associated with the dominant national powers. 
Specifically, many of the world's most influential commercial and financial powers 
operate under very favourable international terms, and the preservation of these terms 
comes to define the economic, political and military interests of the world's most 
influential state, the USA.2 This is an imperial economy with a global reach, not a 
global economy where democratic principles and universal standards of fairness and 
transparency apply. Monbiot calls the Global Justice Movement to strongly advocate 
for a new and morally credible world order where economic justice and democratic 
rights3 are equally extended to all the inhabitants of the globe. We need a genuinely 
global economy to replace the present undemocratic and internationalist economic 
world order, where wealth disparity between the rich and the poor continues to 
escalate,4 and where international financial institutions, such as the IMF, are 
structurally5 and functionally6 partial to the vested interests of the already rich and 
powerful. 
                                                 
1 Monbiot, G., The Age of Consent, Flamingo, London, 2003 
2 The connection between the enormous sums of money used to run American election campaigns and 
the intensive donating and lobbying presence of highly lucrative corporate interests in Washington – 
not to mention the intimate relationship between Washington and the dominant global players in 
international arms, oil and finance – makes normative distinction between what is good for powerful 
global corporate and financial interests and what is good for domestic American politics hard to 
differentiate. 
3  See Arundahti Roy’s  (www.guardian.co.uk/saturday_review/story/0,3605,559756,00.html) “The 
Algebra of Infinite Justice.” Roy lists many occasions where the CIA has subverted democracy and 
supported brutal dictatorial regimes in the developing world. Monbiot is not here calling for an 
American rhetoric of “freedom and democracy” which in fact subverts political and economic 
freedoms for many of the people of developing nations. Monbiot is actually calling for intrinsic 
political respect and proportional political power for all the people of the globe. 
4 See Milanovic, B., “True world Income Distribution”, Economics Journal, Royal Economic Society, 
January 2002. See Kanbur, R., Attacking Poverty, 17 January 2000 Draft Version of the World 
Development Report 2000/1 www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/draft/100.htm  
5See Monbiot, G., The Age of Consent, (Flamingo, London, 2003) pp 142 – 155. Monbiot here 
describes the ways in which the USA has assured voting weightings and constitutional safeguards that 
protect its power of veto in the IMF, the World Bank and the UN Security Council. No other national 
power has these controlling powers over our international institutions. 
6 See Stiglitz, J., Globalisation and its Discontents (Allen Lane, UK, 2002) for a detailed description of 
the manner in which IMF policy in the past 15 years has systematically protected and assisted 
international financial speculators at the great expense of the poor and of political stability in the 
nations it has “assisted”. 
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There is a global ethic 
 
Hans Küng believes7 a global ethic exists as a matter of simple fact.8 Küng starts his 
exploration of a global ethic from the undisputed genealogical reality that religion - 
not philosophy or science - is the originating ground of ethical belief traditions in all 
cultures. Hence, if one looks for common ethical principles in all religions, it is not 
hard to come up with a skeletal but none the less unequivocal set of core moral values 
that are universal.  
 
The Declaration of The Religions for a Global Ethic9 agreed to by the Parliament of 
the World’s Religions at Chicago in 1993 sets out such a global ethic. This parliament 
noted that Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Jainism, Buddhism and 
Hinduism all adhere to what is commonly called the Golden Rule.10 This is the basic 
principle of treating others as you yourself would wish to be treated.11 Thus the 
Golden Rule provides us with a functional universal core to moral practise. From 
here, as a minimum focus of consensus, four fundamental ethical demands are 
universally recognised:  
 
• You shall not kill. 
• You shall not steal. 
• You shall not lie. 
• Respect and love one another. 
                                                 
7 See Küng, H., A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, SCM Press, London, 1997; Global 
Responsibility, The Crossroad Publishing Company, USA, 1991; Yes to a Global Ethic (Ed. Küng, H.,) 
SCM Press, London, 1996; A Global Ethic (Ed. Küng, H., & Kuschel, K.,) Continuum, New York, 
1993. 
8 What Küng means by “fact” here (see Küng, H., A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, 
SCM Press, London, 1997, p 94.) draws on the work of Michael Walzer, with particular reference to 
Walzer’s Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, USA, 1994). Walzer notes the factual reality of what he calls 
the “thin” but nevertheless universal recognition of basic moral appeals, such as truth and justice, 
within the contemporary culturally pluralistic global context. Thus Walzer is able to reconcile both 
universality with pluralism by seeing “thin” (Küng prefers the term “elementary”) and universal 
understandings of the essence of moral belief and practise as the ontological foundation of “thick” 
(Küng prefers the term “culturally differentiated”) and pluralistic understandings of culturally specific 
moral beliefs and practises. 
9 http://astro.temple.edu/~dialogue/Center/kung.htm   
10 See A Global Ethic (Ed. Küng, H., & Kuschel, K.,) Continuum, New York, 1993 for a full list of 
participants at the 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions. Though, in reference to "the golden rule", 
I have only mentioned what are called the world religions above, it is to be noted that 
Indigenous/Traditional religions were also well represented in the Parliament of Religions which 
gathered in Chicago, and were in unanimous agreement with the Declaration to come out of that 
meeting. 
11 "Confucius (c.551-489 BCE): 'What you yourself do not want, do not do to another person' 
(Analects 15.23). Rabbi Hillel (60 BCE - 10 CE): 'Do not do to others what you would not wish them 
to do to you.' (Shabbat 31a). Jesus of Nazareth: 'Whatever you want people to do to you, do also to 
them (Matt 7.12, Luke 6.31). Islam: 'None of you is a believer as long as he does not wish his brother 
what he wishes himself' (Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi, 13). Jainism: 'Human beings should be 
indifferent to worldly things and treat all creatures in the world as they would want to be treated 
themselves' (Sutrakritanga I, 11,33). Buddhism: 'A state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for me will 
also not be so for him; and how can I impose on another a state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for 
me?' (Samyutta Nikaya V, 353,35-342,2). Hinduism: 'One should not behave towards others in a way 
which is unpleasant for oneself: that is the essence of morality' (Mahabharata XIII, 114,8)." from 
Küng, H., A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, SCM Press, London, 1997, pp 98 - 99. 
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Küng claims that the essential validity of the principles of non-violence, justice and 
transparency in all interpersonal dealings, and the essential validity of relational 
norms being governed by the attitude of intrinsic respect and interdependent 
responsibility, are universally recognised as basic to moral goodness.  
 
The Linkage problem 
 
Monbiot’s and Küng’s propositions are, it seems, radical simply because they both 
view economic practicalities in morally directed terms. In practise, linking even the 
most basic and widely accepted ethical vision with the pragmatics of politics and 
economics is fraught with frustrations.  
 
Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights12 from 1997 to 2002, 
holds that the Chicago Declaration of a global ethic by the World’s Religions, and the 
Vienna Declaration13 reaffirming universal human rights by the world’s States, 
provide us with ample evidence that a clear and compelling universal moral 
consciousness exists amongst all the people of the globe. We know how we should 
behave and we know what basic standards morally legitimate governance should 
conform to, in all cultural contexts. Mary Robinson comments that:  
 
we have no need for new pledges and commitments. They are all there in 
solemn language. We need something more prosaic: implementation, 
implementation, implementation!14 
 
Why can't we get any substantive and radical implementation of our global ethic in 
global politics and global economics? 
 
 
2. The implementation glass ceiling: Das Weltanschauung 
 
Philosophers call our culturally defined, tacit interpretive framework of basic 
assumptions and beliefs, our Weltanschauung or “world view”. In direct contradiction 
to what Monbiot and Küng put forward, our Modern Western Weltanschauung makes 
it natural for us to assume that the amoral global economy is what is real and a global 
ethic impossible. 
                                                 
12 For the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see: www.un.org/Overview/rights.html New York, 
1948. 
13 In 1993 the UN convened a World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. This was a remarkable 
conference where 7000 participants, including academics, treaty bodies, national institutions and 
representatives of over 800 NGOs, met to reaffirm the 1948 Declaration of Universal Human Rights. 
Representatives of 171 states adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action to advance the 
universal implementation of human rights as a result of this conference.  For the Vienna Declaration 
ratifying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see: 
www.unhchr.ch/huridocda.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument Vienna, 1993. 
14 Robinson, M., Second Global Ethics Lecture, The Global Ethics Foundation, University of Tübigen, 
21 January 2002, www.weltethos.org/dat_eng/st_9e_xx/9e_144.htm   
 5
Weltanschauung assumption 1: globalization exists  
 
We tend to naturally assume that globalization is the reality of our world now, and it 
is an essentially amoral commercial process where so called "free market forces", as 
they now operate, continue to press forward into every sphere of human life in every 
corner of the globe.15 Thus globalization renders the non-commercial goals of 
national governments progressively less relevant to the realities of power in the globe. 
We also tend to assume that the development of globalization thus understood 
proceeds both indefinitely and inevitably, ironically reminiscent of Marx's economic 
determinism.16 Hence, we tend to assume that whether we like it or not, we must 
adapt our political expectations to the unassailable power of commercially driven 
globalisation. We must learn how to ride globalization or it will crush and discard us. 
 
Weltanschauung assumption 2: a global ethic cannot exist 
 
We tend to naturally assume that the very idea of a universal ethic is immoral. Moral 
beliefs cannot be universal because they are entirely constructed by very different 
cultures, and those culturally defined beliefs are then further re-constructed by a far 
greater plurality of individual belief and lifestyle preferences. Hence we uphold a 
transcendently anchorless cultural relativism in regard to shared values,17 and we 
uphold the basic right of private freedom in regard to our individual value beliefs.18 
We also tend to believe the so called “realist” view that the underlying reality of all 
interhuman relationships and all social and political structures, is self interested 
power, not intrinsic dignity.19 Were a global ethic to be promulgated, it must, by 
definition, be a hegemonic and unjustifiable grand theory that will in fact be a vehicle 
for the power interests of the dominant global culture, and an affront to individual 
freedoms of conscience.  
 
These tacit beliefs about the nature of globalization and the nature of ethics have 
settled down deeply in the basic and unconscious belief assumptions of both the 
rational and practical operational paradigms of our Modern Western culture. There, 
                                                 
15 This is heralded as a great progress for humanity by strong supporters of globalization so 
understood. For example, Robert Cooper, a senior member of the Diplomatic Service in the UK, sees 
Consumerism as a far more humane and sensible philosophy of politics and personal meaning for the 
inhabitants of the globe than the strong ideologies of religion and justice which have been vehicles for 
so much violence and oppression in human history. (See Cooper, R., "Foreign Policy, Values and 
Globalization" pp 57 - 66, in Bently & Jones (ed.) The Moral Universe, Demos, UK, 2001.)  
16 Marx was, after all, a Classical Economist heavily influenced by Comtean Positivism. This gives him 
a far greater kindred spirit with the ideological determinism of contemporary Neo-Classical 
Economists than these champions of free market capitalism tend to recognise. 
17This cultural relativism carries with it the implied view of “tolerance” to culturally defined views of 
morality that we may find immoral. 
18 This self-referenced view of values construction carries with it an implied arbitrary solipsism.  
19 It should be noted here that Küng goes to considerable lengths to reconcile the reality of power with 
the reality of intrinsic value by understanding humanity as fundamentally morally ambivalent (ie 
neither essential “realist” or essentially “idealist” but essentially both). His analysis of the history of 
world politics since Richelieu moves from “the strengths and weaknesses of a real politics orientated 
on power and interests, [to an analysis of] the strength and weaknesses of [a Wilsonian] ideal politics 
orientated on moral principles, and finally [to develop] the perspective of a politics of responsibility, 
which tries to take seriously ideals and realities, principles and interests, rights and obligations at the 
same time – all in the framework of a world society which needs a global ethic as a basis.”  Küng, H., 
A Global Ethic for a Global Politics and Economics, SCM Press, London, 1997, p 115.    
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they silently define what is and what is not possible when we consider globalization 
and ethics.  
 
Understanding implementation frustration 
 
The significance of our Weltanschauung for any attempt to change the basic way our 
global civilisation operates cannot be over-estimated. Specifically, no governance of 
our global economic practises by our ethical beliefs can be strongly desired and 
rationally implemented whilst our Weltanschauung continues to hold beliefs about the 
nature of economics and ethics which makes their separation both rational and 
practically necessary. Global agreements and declarations will have minimal traction 
in the actual practise of law, politics and commerce whilst the concepts they use are 
basically foreign to the generally accepted belief assumptions on which our current 
world order now operates. Our world view beliefs must change first if our world order 
is to change peacefully; for intelligent human agency is always premised on our basic 
beliefs about the nature of reality.  
 
As urgent and credible as the radical propositions of Monbiot and Küng are, we 
cannot avoid tackling the actuality of the unconscious metaphysical assumptions of 
our Modern Western Weltanschauung which oppose them. We must deal with the fact 
that our Weltanschauung only allows a global ethic to exist in the private sphere of 
personal beliefs which cannot be strongly politically implemented, and our 
Weltanschauung really believes in the facticity and hence, the tacit validity, of  “the 
global economy” as at currently functions. 
 
We must deal with the reality of our Weltanschauung, but that does not mean we have 
to accept its legitimacy. 
 
The need to overcome our Weltanschauung’s separation of economics from 
ethics 
 
I confess, I am hoping to see a global revolution of ethical economics and ethical 
politics. And I don't see how anyone can do anything other than be similarly 
radicalised if they can see three obvious features of the world as it now is. Due to the 
depth and extent of human misery our current world order perpetuates, due to the 
medium to long term environmental destructiveness of our current affluent lifestyles, 
and due to the global political instability and violence we are shooting towards on our 
current trajectory, we have no reasonable alternative other than to pursue radical and 
urgent change to the basic structure of how we approach thinking about and acting in 
the world. If we wish to hold to a view of ourselves as possessing any degree of 
simple humanity, any degree of basic prudence, or any degree of self interested 
foresight, we cannot ignore these concerns. Apathy is not an option. All obstacles 
must be overcome in order to secure this link or we are dooming our children, our 
civilisation, the global majority, and possibly the globe itself. 
 
Identify obstacles to linking ethics with economics 
 
There are two types of obstacles to the linking of the global ethic with the global 
economy. There are practical obstacles embedded in the vested power interests and 
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entrenched power structures of the world order as it now stands. And there are 
metaphysical20 obstacles embedded in the roots of our Western Weltanschauung 
which allows practical spheres to operate according to their own internal logic, with a 
large degree of legitimacy, independently of moral concerns.  
 
Why metaphysical obstacles to linking ethics to economics must be tackled 
 
The metaphysical obstacles are more difficult and more important to overcome than 
the practical ones. Or, put as Monbiot explains it, if we can get a “metaphysical 
mutation”21 regarding our basic beliefs about moral legitimacy and its political and 
economic implications, then the practical realities of power must change in 
conformity to what broadly held belief constructs of legitimacy will allow.22  
 
Entrenched status, economic, managerial, religious and political power elites 
generally see themselves and their actions as being morally legitimate – either overtly 
or tacitly.23 Where the majority on whom their elite status depends reject their moral 
legitimacy and are able to change laws in order to morally discipline elite power, 
these elites either capitulate to the moral standards required to re-assert their 
legitimacy, or they attempt to rule via naked coercion. Naked coercion destroys the 
ground on which it stands and does not have a long term viability.  
 
It is beliefs about moral legitimacy which ultimately shape and rule the world.  
 
In order to understand the foundational architecture of our Weltanschauung - where in 
the metaphysical presuppositions of our beliefs about moral legitimacy and its 
legitimate implementation lie - we will have to go a long way from both economics 
                                                 
20 The term “metaphysics” has been greatly derided in Western philosophy through most of the 
twentieth century. This is because Modernism believed that the only valid foundation of philosophical 
thought was epistemology (the theory of knowledge). Anything about which one could not have 
certain knowledge, or at least empirically verifiable knowledge, or at least sceptically probable 
knowledge, or at least empirically falsifiable knowledge, was considered a phantom of speculative 
imagination not worthy of philosophical credence. Hence metaphysics - philosophical thought about 
things that are not within the scope of direct empirical investigation or the scope of “certain” or  
scientifically probable knowledge - was roundly debunked. However, with the critique of what Charles 
Taylor calls “epistemological foundationalism” thought about non physical things – such as values, 
meaning, love, essence, intrinsic dignity, God, spirituality, beauty etc – are slowly coming back into 
mainstream philosophical discourse. (Maybe the meaning drought in Western philosophy is breaking?) 
And indeed, as Bergmann pointed out in 1954, epistemological foundationalism was itself premised on 
unprovable and epistemologically unfounded metaphysical assumptions. So metaphysics, as the 
exploration of basic beliefs about the nature and meaning of reality, in ontological rather than 
epistemological terms, is starting to revive. When I talk about metaphysics in this paper I am simply 
referring to our attempt to understand our unprovable basic value and meaning beliefs – those beliefs 
of most interest in any given Weltanschauung - and I do not impute any necessary philosophical 
invalidity or intellectual embarrassment to those beliefs.   
21 Monbiot here borrows Michel Houllebecq’s phrase. See Chapter one in Monbiot’s The Age of 
Consent (op cit). 
22 The success of the Abolition of Slavery movement is an example of where an aroused politico-moral 
consciousness effectively altered the structure of Western societies, though very powerful economic, 
political and status concerns were opposed to this cause.   
23 That is, very few people are comfortable with seeing themselves as being wilfully morally evil. For 
example, repeatedly high flying CEO’s and who have fabulously enriched themselves whilst ruining 
millions of shareholders in cataclysmic corporate collapses in both Australia (HIH) and the USA 
(Enron) in recent times, claim they have done nothing wrong and accept no moral or legal culpability. 
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and ethics. This may seem off track at first, but the necessity of this type of project in 
trying to build a new Western Weltanschauung should be apparent when even a very 
sketchy excursion into our cultural history has been outlined. 
 
3. A potted history of Western facts and meanings 
 
The separation of empirical facts from non-empirical meanings is the great triumph of 
the Modernist outlook. We couldn't have science, technology, commerce, secular 
government, and personal freedoms of conscience and religion - as we understand 
them - without this separation. It’s a separation which was hard fought for, and yet 
this separation is now breaking down in ways which have a fragmenting impact on 
our Weltanschauung.24 Our Weltanschauung is now instable and ripe for radical 
reform. 
 
The shifting relationship between facts and meanings in Western culture can be traced 
through five conceptually distinct (though historically interacting) phases: Premodern, 
Early-Modern, Modern, Late-Modern and Postmodern. Understanding the history of 
this relationship is of particular importance for understanding our current struggle to 
link the non-empirical meanings of ethics with the empirical facts of economics. 
 
Facts and Meaning in the Premodern West: the hegemony of meanings over 
facts. 
 
In the Premodern outlook which dominated Mediaeval Western Europe, facts and 
meanings were intimately tied together. The cosmos was seen as a living revelation of 
God's divine love and purpose, and all facts of nature and humanity were imbued with 
religious meaning. Theology was the queen of all knowledge, and so meaning defined 
facts. The Middle Ages had a liturgical and hierarchical cultural Weltanschauung. 
Yet, theologians in particular were able to question and shift understandings about 
facts and meanings, so this is not a static period of philosophy,25 literature and 
knowledge. Specifically, two Mediaeval theologians, Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) 
and William of Ockham (1285 - 1349), radically challenged the Augustinian outlook 
which was the foundation of the Middle Ages, prefiguring the early Moderns and 
making a reassessment of the nature of facts and meanings possible.  
 
                                                 
24 In the 21st century our Western cultural outlook tends to dis-integrate in this manner: the knowledge 
and power aspects of our culture tend to be embedded in the outlook of Modernity, with its clear 
value/fact separatism whilst, at the same time, the personal and meaning aspects of our culture tend to 
be embedded in the outlooks of Postmodernity, which do not accept any clear value/fact separatism. 
25 Back in 1950, F. Copleston (A History of Philosophy, Vol 2, Part I, Mediaeval Philosophy, The 
Newman Press, USA, 1950) noted that it was commonplace for post-Enlightenment philosophers to 
have a very poor knowledge of Mediaeval ("Dark Ages") philosophy for they believed that because 
this philosophy was done by theologians, it could not be taken seriously by Modern thinkers. This 
view, notes Copleston, is not only amazingly ignorant and presumptuous, but also implies that there 
was no philosophical development in the West between the Ancient Classical culture and Modern 
culture. This Modernist view has no historical validity, but it is remarkable how little things seem to 
have changed over the past 50 years. Goethe famously said that one who does not know the past two 
thousand years of one's cultural heritage, is living from hand to mouth. The Middle Ages, 1000 years 
of Western cultural development leading directly to the Modern Ages, profoundly shapes our cultural 
Weltanschauung to this day. We cannot afford to not know our own story if we are trying to reshape 
the basic outlooks on which we as a civilisation perceive, think and act.  
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When Aquinas greatly expanded an Aristotelian theology for the West, he validated a 
theological method into Western Europe that worked in the opposite direction to the 
mind which stands over Western culture for 1000 years, Augustine. Augustine's 
Platonic, top down approach to philosophy, where transcendence defines nature, came 
to coexist uneasily with Aquinas' Aristotelian, bottom up approach to philosophy, 
where the observation of nature expounds transcendence. Under Aquinas, the West’s 
new found fascination with a close observation of the mechanisms and purposes of 
nature (as greatly aided by Islamic science and scholarship), made it eventually 
possible for non theologians like Descartes to try and use reason and observation 
without deference to received theological presuppositions. 
  
The Western separation of faith from reason and the birth of the autonomous 
individual also have their roots deep in the Middle Ages. William of Ockham rejected 
Augustine's mystical rationalism,26 separating mystery out from reason in a manner 
that points towards not only the separation of values and facts of Modernism, but 
which set the trajectory for the rejection of all beliefs that were not scientifically 
defined, prefiguring Comte. In Augustine revelation and faith are fundamental and 
indispensable to human identity, and to all experience, all knowledge and all 
meaning. 27 All knowledge here can only be grounded in faith. Reason is dependent 
on faith for its very existence. But William of Ockham, in the nominalist tradition, 
sets reason and faith in separate spheres and debunks the holism of Augustine’s 
Platonic Idealism. In William of Ockham, to borrow from Wittgenstein, the language 
game of reason does not intersect with the language game of faith, and both are 
legitimate in their own separate right, and for their own separate purposes. It is not 
hard to move from here to saying that only things which are analytical and empirical 
can be in the region of reasonable knowledge, and that as rational beings, we cannot 
know matters of value and meaning with any certainty. The trajectory of William of 
                                                 
26 As Tillich notes, the correct term here is really “mystical realism”. But since Realism in the Middle 
Ages means something like Idealism to the Modern ear, and since William of Ockham’s Nominalism 
was the source of Modern Realism, and since the Modern ear tends to see no relationship between 
mysticism and reason, I thought “mystical rationalism” a good term to use for this context. Tillich's 
section on William of Ockham in his A History of Christian Theology (SCM Press, London, 1968, pp 
198 – 201) is a concise and penetrating description of how pivotal William of Ockham's thought is for 
the dissolution of the Middle Ages and the instigation of the Modern Ages. 
27 It is interesting to note the similarities and differences in Augustine's and Descartes’ quests to 
overcome doubt. Augustine goes down the pathway of scepticism to be confronted, in the immediacy 
of his own consciousness, with the presence of God, as the ground and origin of his own "I". Thus 
faith, the revealed reality of his existential relational adherence in God grasped through that faith, and 
then both the immanent and transcendent reality of God Himself, is the ground on which all thought 
and perception must stand for Augustine. The universe and human community is thus grounded in the 
one transcendent reality of God. Reality is a unified field and meaning and fact can have no 
independence here. William of Ockham rejects Augustine's view; to him God is an individual and I am 
an individual (ie my being is not intrinsically grounded in God's being) and the premises of faith 
operate independently of the premises of reason. Descartes, taking on board William of Ockham's 
nominalist view about the nature of individual identity goes, via the path of scepticism, to ground his 
thinking in his own thought as an individual. Here reason and personal autonomy validated by the 
epistemological method of doubt, stand in their own right as unassailable givens (though God is still 
prepositionally necessary as a guarantor of the legitimacy of the thoughts Descartes' rational 
autonomous self has). Now, for all practical purposes, reason can function independently of faith. But 
now also, the universe and community is essentially unknowable, because the autonomous rational "I" 
is the locus of all knowledge. Now we are in the Modern world. 
 10
Ockham’s thought leads eventually to 20th Century Logical Positivism – the high 
water mark of the separation of facts from non-empirical meanings.28 
 
Facts and Meanings in the Early-Modern West: the desire for autonomy. 
 
Descartes made the decisive separation between facts and meanings, and is hence 
rightly revered as the father of the Modernist philosophical outlook. Descartes wanted 
to understand the meaning of facts without bringing preconceived interpretive 
prejudices to his observations. In doing this he imputed an autonomy to factual 
knowledge from belief grounded, cultural interpretive meaning frameworks. This 
imputed autonomy legitimates the search for objective certainty, the disdain of 
subjective prejudice, and the scepticism of appearance which is so central to the 
Modernist scientific outlook. Descartes grounds his claim on truth (understood as 
certain, factual knowledge) on the strength of his theory of knowledge (his 
epistemology), not on any ontological givens which are sanctioned by divinely 
inspired authority sources. This is the birth of Modernist epistemological 
foundationalism. This is critical to our Weltanschauung. We - as the children of 
Modern culture - ground claims to what can be considered to be true on the basis of 
what we can have certain, objective, empirically and logically valid knowledge of; 
knowledge not referenced to any non-empirical or spiritually transcendent source. 
 
As the formal links between Church and State which exist today in most Western 
Secular society illustrates, Western secularism is not primarily about the formal 
separation of the church from the state. Our secularism is the far more extensive 
principle of autonomy separating private beliefs about intangible meanings and values 
from public information about tangible facts and tangible public behaviours. 
Descartes made this secularism possible. Further, the process Descartes set in motion 
went far beyond the scope of his own apparent beliefs about how reason and faith and 
facts and meanings could harmoniously interact once they were functionally 
independent of each other. 
 
Facts and Meanings in Modernity: mutual autonomy of fact from meaning 
recognised, within a generally theological Weltanschauung. 
 
Moving through the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the success of science and 
technology, the liberalisation of personal belief and political attitudes, and the social 
and commercial transformation of the rise of the middle class functionally distanced 
the discourses and spheres of operation between objective facts and private meanings 
markedly. Noted philosophers – such as Hegel – tried to synthesise facts and 
meanings, and physicality with spirituality,29 but the trajectory of this period into 
Late-Modernism is largely one of rejection of those attempts at synthesis, and 
embracing of those theorists who separated these spheres (eg Kant). Generally, in this 
period facts and meanings operated reasonably autonomously without much obvious 
tension, within a broadly theological Weltanschauung. Practically, the tacit role of 
ethical and religious beliefs in politics could still be drawn on to effect law and 
                                                 
28 See Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin, London, 1936.  
29 In Hegel, science and religion, facts and meanings, politics and ethics, logic and spirit etc, are all 
unified under the grand synthetic systemic structure of Hegelian Idealism. See Taylor, C., Hegel, 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1975. 
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enforce civil values with powerful effect, as is illustrated by the Abolitionist 
movement.  
 
The giant of this era in Western philosophy is Kant. Kant wished to justify the claims 
of autonomous reason in such a way that he hoped would make room for faith, but 
which in fact simply made faith completely irrelevant to both science and reason. He 
also wished to establish an objective ethic, derived only from reason. Kant’s work 
was to make the credibility of the beliefs of the generally theological Weltanschauung 
untenable in the academy and to make it possible for the academic to reject all ethical 
beliefs not defined in terms of either reason or science. 
 
Late-Modernity: hegemony of fact over meaning - the generally materialist 
Weltanschauung 
 
The 19th and 20th centuries were characterised by a massive Weltanschauung shift in 
the West, away from one premised on broadly accepted theological premises (even 
for atheists), to one premised on broadly accepted materialist premises (even for 
theists). Comte, Darwin, Marx and Freud came to establish totally religion free 
ontological30 grounds of intellectually respected thought about the nature of society, 
human origins, economic activity and personal identity. By the time Ayer writes his 
hugely influential Language Truth and Logic in 1936, the hegemony of fact over 
meaning is willingly embraced by the most influential circles in English speaking 
philosophical academia. This new atmosphere of factual realism sets the trajectory of 
progressive education31 in the West, greatly contributing to the post 1960s outlook 
which prides itself in discarding traditional beliefs, traditional ethical prohibitions and 
traditional social institutions. This hegemony of facts over meaning is set within a 
materialist cosmology which not only thinks transcendence cannot be known, but that 
it obviously does not exist. There is no spiritual source for values and no basis for 
belief in any intrinsic worth. All values and meanings are cultural constructions which 
express statements of emotion and will, and hence no rational dispute can be found to 
arbitrate them. The apparent unity of facts and meanings Logical Positivism achieved 
– ie facts can only mean what analytical or empirical language can reasonably 
describe, and meaning can only refer to statements about fact – is actually the 
annihilation of all meanings and values which are not defined within the perimeters of 
analytical or empirical language.  
 
Postmodernity: no facts and no meanings, or no facts, or a striving towards the 
unification of fact and meaning – the confused Weltanschauung 
 
In regard to the relationship between facts and values, I think there are three flavours 
of Postmodernism.  
 
Nihilistic Postmodernism sees the narrative of science and objective instrumental 
reason as just another power narrative with no necessary relationship to reality. This 
                                                 
30 More precisely, these great thinkers had an ontology of no ontology. And it cannot be escaped, an 
implied stance which recognises no knowable essential intrinsic meaning is a stance of negative 
spiritual essence, it is potently ontological and theological. 
31 See C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, written in 1948, noting the massive shift in educational 
philosophy taking place in the post-war era. 
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view flows directly from Late-Modernism by accepting the metaphysical conviction 
that “meaning” exists only in the socially and individually constructed world of 
language, and hence knowledge of reality in any shape or form is not possible. 
Nihilistic Postmodernism – quite logically – applies the anti-metaphysical agenda of 
Late-Modernism to the Late-Modernist residual faith in science and is characterised 
by disbelief in the very idea of “the real” and a determined affirmation of both 
cultural and individual solipsism. Here, both facts and meanings have no substantial 
meaning; this is the end result of the essentially sceptical and self referencing 
methodology of Modernist knowledge, which is the very foundation of Modernism.32 
So Nihilistic Postmodernism is Modernism Absurdum. It is not really Postmodern at 
all and is more accurately called Hyper-Modernism.  
 
Subjective Postmodernism also rejects the hegemony of facts and science, but seeks 
internal or emotional authenticity as its avenue to meaning. However, taking an 
existential route from a Modernist epistemological point of departure makes meaning 
so radically private, so radically subjective, so aware of its own power dynamic if it 
makes any claims to communal legitimacy, that – for all cultural and political 
purposes – it effectively disappears. 
 
And then there is Holistic Postmodernism which rejects epistemological 
foundationalism and the whole Modernist outlook on ontology, and again, seeks to 
unify facts and meanings.33 This type of outlook has respect for what Küng calls the 
“depth dimension” of our cultural traditions of human meaning whilst also respecting 
the gains of Modern scientific knowledge. 
 
Add to these very different forms of Postmodernism the prevailing reality of 
Modernism in our pragmatic operational paradigms, and you get a fabulously 
confused and alienating Weltanschauung bringing us right up to the present. 
 
 
4. Modernism and Postmodernism blended – the present situation 
 
Late-Modernism’s impact came to radically redefine the role of the humanities in 
Western education after World War Two. The study of human culture in its own 
terms was progressively replaced by the study of society and the individual in 
scientific terms. Literature, under Positivistic Critical Theory, is now primarily 
understood as an expression of the political dynamics and structures operative in any 
given social milieu, and the deep aesthetic yearnings and high transcendent longings 
expressed in literature are no longer open to interactive engagement on their own 
terms. We know better than the writer what moved them – their literature is important 
as an imaginative and skilfully crafted form of influential social construction, but its 
content is merely the expression of emotion and power. Science education ticked over 
as usual in its own specialised terms but with the practical foci of technology and 
                                                 
32 See Taylor’s critique of Modernist epistemological foundationalism. Chapter 4 of Ruth Abbey’s 
Charles Taylor (Acumen, UK, 2000) overviews this critique with clarity and accessibility. 
33 Michael Polanyi is a great example of this type of postmodern attempt at unifying objective facts 
with personal meanings. To Polanyi, truth is the external pole of belief; facts and meanings are 
interdependent, yet both are externally referenced in reality (ie reality is a unified field constructed of 
both facts and meanings) and both can be tested by each other. See Jha, S.R., Reconsidering Michael 
Polanyi's Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002. 
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business expanding exponentially, and social and psyche sciences became more 
mechanistic and mathematical, mirroring the “hard” sciences as much as they could. 
Thus the tacit reduction of meaning to fact came to settle deeply in the conscious 
mental constructions of our view of the world. The legacy of Late-Modernism’s 
powerful influence over mid to late 20th century education is the generally perceived 
legitimacy of practical activities governed by purely instrumental and procedural 
reason, and the generally perceived relativism, subjectivism and emotivism of moral 
values and spiritual beliefs. Late-Modernism, deeply embedded in our tacit 
assumptions, accepts this view more or less happily. Postmodernism rejects it, but 
often forms curious alliances with different aspects of Late-Modernism. Where there 
is no credence given to the truth and objective validity of any narrative of meaning 
the total independence of narratives is the only sacred principle. Hence different 
narratives cannot critique one another with reference to “reality” and different 
narrative families – such as factual narratives and value narratives – operate with total 
autonomy from each other.34  
 
Late-Modernism provides us with no agreed foundation for communally accepted 
moral truth, but it does provide us with a communally accepted paradigm of 
instrumental rationality. Postmodernism rests, if you like, on the Late-Modern 
absence of ontological and moral foundation, but also recognises the meaninglessness 
and relativity of pragmatic rationality. But this later recognition provides no powerful 
leverage point from which to critique the actions and visions of “the practical man”.35 
Objections are seen by “the practical man” as expressions of emotion, not grounded in 
the factual reality of commercial action or the political imperatives to produce 
tangible material benefits to the constituency.  
 
                                                 
34 For example, a public servant working within a Late-Modern pragmatic Neo-Classical Economic 
view of business realities can have Subjectivist Postmodern personal beliefs about morality, and the 
two systems of thought co-exist comfortably in different spheres that do not speak to each other when 
it comes to the global economy. Such a public servant can re-affirm the Declaration of Human Rights 
on behalf of their nation in Vienna, but when it comes to it, that value narrative (as a Postmodern 
belief) does not intersect with the pragmatic narrative of economic necessity (as a Late-Modern belief) 
unless things can be done to promote the ultraliberal ideology of the moral virtue and social good 
produced by the unfettered pursuit of corporate profit. Though here, one does not need to have a PhD 
in moral philosophy to sense that Milton Friedman’s understanding of the moral virtue of the profit 
motive flies in the face of the most essential tenants of the world’s depth traditions of moral 
understanding. See Friedman, M., “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, 
www.rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprints.friedman.html  New York Times Magazine, 13 
September 1970. And see Küng’s critique of this concept of morality in “Domestication of ethics by 
the economy”, in,  A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, 1997, op cit., pp 190 – 192. 
35 This is a reference to Keynes' famous pronouncement that "the ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt form any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madmen in 
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few 
years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas." (Keynes, J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money, Prometheus Books, New York, 1997, p 383.) That is, "practical men" do function from a 
coherent set of metaphysical belief commitments, no matter how unaware of it they usually are. Only a 
clear understanding of their metaphysics, and a well thought out alternative metaphysics can properly 
challenge and replace the juggernaut of the alliance between status and powerful vested interests which 
define a "realistic" view of what it is practically possible to achieve.  
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Late-Modernism, and its transcendence inoculated progenies (Nihilistic Hyper-
Modernism and Subjective Postmodernism), have failed Western culture dismally.36 
These outlooks do not meet the deepest human needs for meaning and meaningful 
communal life, and they set us on a trajectory of cultural implosion and global 
explosion. Further, the very social and spiritual dynamism of Modernism itself rested 
on those Premodern ontological beliefs which Late-Modernism so vehemently set out 
to destroy.  
 
Küng notes that 
 
the modern liberal social order has for a long time been able to rely on 'habits 
of the heart', on a thick 'cushion' of pre-modern systems of meaning and 
obligation which today are now 'thread bear'.37 
 
The success of Late-Modernism seems to have swept away our confidence in the 
validity of all the deep metaphysical and religious beliefs of the Western civilisation, 
leaving us with only shallow, constructed and superficial concepts of personal and 
communal meaning. Yet now, the awareness is dawning that we have poisoned the 
soil in which Modernism has its roots, and the whole Western edifice of values and 
meanings necessary to sustain civil life is now in jeopardy. 
 
The fragmentation of our Weltanschauung into incommensurable discourses of fact-
meaning-purpose-belief narratives, influenced by all five phases of the rise and fall of 
Modernism, makes it very difficult to have any culturally coherent vision of meaning 
and ethical value. Yet this scenario also allows the one paradigm that is still able to 
work under the guise of linear coherence - pragmatism - virtual free reign in the 
political economy. People like Mary Robinson struggle profoundly to try and 
stimulate the level of cultural coherence necessary to produce the genuine political 
will to get the real, on the ground implementation of ethical politics and economics. 
The problem here is what the Bible calls the indistinct call.38 On the Postmodern side 
for moral change we find too many competing and incommensurable narratives of 
scantly reality linked meaning, no viable political medium for reform, the awareness 
of personal entanglement in immoral vested interests, and a profound sense of 
impotence. On the Late-Modernist side of the status quo, we find a unified narrative 
of "realism", pragmatism, necessity and instrumental reason, as well as all the 
political and propaganda resources of self protection available to the rich and 
powerful.  
 
Yet, out of the Postmodern cacophony something like a coherent call is emerging. 
There is hope. This hope is to be found in that face of Postmodernism which seeks to 
unite facts and meanings, which does not reject the gains of Modernity, but does not 
accept the autonomy of reason from belief and meaning.39 And, as David Tacey 
                                                 
36 Marion Countess Dönhoff notes that "the exclusive this-worldliness which cuts human beings off 
from their metaphysical sources; the total positivism which is concerned only with the surface of things 
and allows the depth-dimension to be forgotten, these cannot represent a lasting meaning for human 
beings." (Küng, H., ibid, 1997, p 133.) 
37 Küng, H., A Global Ethic … op cit, p132. 
38 1 Corinthians 14:7 "If the bugle gives an indistinct call, who will get ready for battle?" 
39 This is the shift from the hermeneutic of fundamental metaphysical and religious suspicion, through 
to a hermeneutic of the tentative suspension of disbelief.  
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points out, this searching Postmodernism, particularly in our youth, is also post-
secular.40 The work of the Parliament of World Religions is of great interest to the 
hopeful face of Postmodernism. 
 
 
5. Overcoming Modernist Separatism: the politics of Holistic Postmodernism  
 
The single biggest hindrance to linking the so called global economy to the global 
ethic is the deep seated separatism in the Modernist Weltanschauung. The separation 
of facts from meanings, the separation of power from morality. But it is a separation 
which is not philosophically justified, which no longer holds much conviction for 
most Westerners, and which is emphatically rejected by those of strong moral 
awareness. As wealth and power polarities continue to escalate within the West (let 
alone the rest of the globe) under the presumed amoral realism of global commerce, 
the rising moral revulsion of how we live and the increasing proportion of disaffected 
and disenfranchised Western citizens, must move things towards morally directed 
political change. Holistic Postmodernism can hardly fail to find its political voice and 
exert its political will sooner or later. But it is a question of whether we will get a 
global French revolution or a global American revolution. It is in the interests of all of 
us to have as bloodless and humane a transition as possible. We need to open up a 
new paradigm channel which can provide a political avenue for radical change within 
the existing order. To do that we need a new or a restored and re-contextualised 
metaphysics which can sustain moral convictions of both depth and realism. The 
wetness of subjective emotivism and culturally constructionist moral relativism must 
go. The optionalism of seeing morals as matters of private conviction which are 
unconnected to the practical realities of the market place must go. In order to get rid 
of them we need to propagate a new Weltanschauung which enables the integration of 
facts and meanings and which is unashamed to re-discover and draw on the depth 
traditions of our own culture, and to respect the depth traditions of other cultures. 
 
We are on the edge of the first truly global civilisation. If this process aborts because 
the power interests of the West won't change their vision, their philosophy and their 
operational paradigm, the destruction that follows will be apocalyptic on an 
unprecedented global scale.41 We must have, as Küng says, a global ethic for a global 
politics and economics. We must get the ethical belief grounds for a global 
civilisation right, and then we can have the global economy that Monbiot so 
courageously describes. 
  
                                                 
40 Tacey, Re-Enchantment, HarperCollins, Australia, 2000.  
41 If we do not succeed in linking the so called global economy to the global ethic, there will be Hell to 
pay. The global village is characterised by untenable power and wealth disparities, by the parade of 
Western self interested power, luxury and indulgence via the global media, by the entrenched systemic 
exploitation of people and nature, by the growing hunger for justice, and by the blithe indifference of 
the global ruling class. The revolutionary dynamics were not so pronounced in Tsarist Russia or in 
Marie Antoinette's France. We must remember that those who do not learn from history are doomed to 
repeat it. We must shift Weltanschauung gears. We must find a way to implement the global ethic in 
the global economy, as our top priority, rather than as a secondary nicety which we think is a good idea 
provided we don't lose any competitive economic advantage. See again Milanovic, B., “True world 
Income Distribution”, Economics Journal, Royal Economic Society, January 2002. And Kanbur, R., 
Attacking Poverty, 17 January 2000 Draft Version of the World Development Report 2000/1 
www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/draft/100.htm  
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